


Too Late to Apologize Appendix:

Figure A1: Interactions of Post-Harm Compensation with Level of Collateral Damage



Note: Results are based on replication of preferred model in text (final column of Table 1), with interactions between condolence spending and Coalition collateral damage (left panel) or Ruzicka spending and Coalition collateral damage (right panel). Plots represent marginal effects of each type of compensation by amount of Coalition harm.

Table A1: Predictors of Post-Harm Compensation, without Differencing and Fixed Effects

	Condolence spending	Ruzicka spending	Condolence spending	Ruzicka spending
<i>Violence</i>				
Lagged insurgent violence	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Coalition collateral damage	0.01* (0.01)	-0.00* (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Insurgent collateral damage	-0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<i>Reconstruction</i>				
Other small CERP spending	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.30* (0.17)	0.01* (0.01)
Other USAID spending	0.11* (0.06)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.05** (0.02)
PRT presence	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.01)
<i>Access</i>				
Coalition troop strength	0.03* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.00)
CMOC presence	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.08 (0.09)	0.01 (0.01)
Population density	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.02)
Percent urban	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.23 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.06)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>				
Half year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Sunni×half year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.11 (0.10)	0.04 (0.06)
Observations	857	857	857	857
R^2	0.43	0.13	0.58	0.30

Notes: Results are from OLS regressions in levels (not differenced) with clustering by district. M3-M4 retain district specific fixed effects, while M1-M2 drop these as well. Civilian compensation is per capita while insurgent violence is per 1000 residents, both over six months. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A2: Correlation Matrix for Post-Harm Compensation and Other Key Variables

Variables	SIGACTs per 1000	Condolence spending pc	Ruzicka spending pc	Coalition damage	Insurgent damage	Other small CERP pc	Other USAID pc	Coalition troops	CMOC presence	PRT presence
SIGACTs per 1000	1.000									
Condolence spending pc	0.100	1.000								
Ruzicka spending pc	0.085	0.053	1.000							
Coalition damage	0.279	0.292	0.049	1.000						
Insurgent damage	0.233	0.018	0.074	0.671	1.000					
Other small CERP pc	0.187	0.012	-0.008	-0.043	0.093	1.000				
Other USAID pc	-0.011	-0.001	0.001	-0.007	-0.001	-0.006	1.000			
Coalition troops	0.249	0.188	0.052	0.537	0.504	0.073	-0.004	1.000		
CMOC presence	0.046	0.021	0.017	0.230	0.287	0.033	-0.010	0.406	1.000	
PRT presence	0.195	-0.014	0.020	0.273	0.419	0.023	-0.004	0.391	0.385	1.000

Notes: figure shows bivariate correlations between post-harm compensation and other relevant conflict dynamics included in base model. Civilian compensation and other spending is per capita while insurgent violence is per 1000 residents. Unit of observation for all measures is district \times half year

Table A3: Tests for Endogeneity and Anticipation Bias

	Lagged SIGACTs	Condolence spending	Ruzicka spending
<i>Civilian Compensation</i>			
Condolence spending per capita	0.49 (0.43)		0.01 (0.01)
Ruzicka spending per capita	-0.55 (0.46)	0.14 (0.15)	
<i>Conflict Dynamics</i>			
Lead of insurgent violence		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Coalition collateral damage	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Insurgent collateral damage	0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Other small CERP spending	0.58 (0.49)	-0.27** (0.13)	0.02 (0.02)
Other USAID spending	-0.11 (0.26)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.07** (0.03)
Coalition troop strength	0.10 (0.06)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.00)
CMOC presence	-0.07 (0.29)	0.19* (0.11)	0.02 (0.01)
PRT presence	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)
Lag of insurgent violence		0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.00)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>			
Half year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sunni×half year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.16 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.01** (0.01)
Observations	824	721	721
R^2	0.23	0.57	0.21

Notes: Results are from first-differenced OLS regressions with clustering by district. Civilian compensation is per capita while insurgent violence is per 1000 residents, both over six months. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Replication of Base Results with Additional Covariates

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
<i>Civilian Compensation</i>					
Condolence spending per capita	-0.52*** (0.19)	-0.52*** (0.19)	-0.58** (0.24)	-0.59** (0.25)	-0.61** (0.26)
Ruzicka spending per capita	-0.98** (0.48)	-1.01** (0.49)	-1.39*** (0.44)	-1.56*** (0.50)	-1.01* (0.51)
<i>Conflict Dynamics</i>					
Coalition collateral damage	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Insurgent collateral damage	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Other small CERP spending	-0.18 (0.25)	-0.20 (0.25)	-0.33 (0.29)	-0.32 (0.29)	-0.30 (0.29)
Other USAID spending	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.15 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.25)	-0.18 (0.25)
Coalition troop strength	0.05 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
CMOC presence	-0.30 (0.34)	-0.37 (0.32)	-0.30 (0.34)	-0.29 (0.35)	-0.41 (0.36)
PRT presence	0.01 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)	0.02 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>					
Half year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sunni×half year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Additional Covariates</i>					
Additional spending types (2)		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged conflict dynamics (4)			Yes	Yes	Yes
Socioeconomic attributes (3)				Yes	Yes
Additional violence types (2)					Yes
Constant	0.09 (0.14)	0.13 (0.13)	0.03 (0.16)	0.03 (0.16)	0.05 (0.16)
Observations	927	927	824	754	754
R^2	0.23	0.24	0.28	0.28	0.29

Notes: Results are from first-differenced OLS regressions with clustering by district. Civilian compensation is per capita while insurgent violence is per 1000 residents, both over six months. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Replication of Base Results without District Fixed Effects

	M1	M2	M3	M4
<i>Civilian Compensation</i>				
Condolence spending per capita	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.39*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.16)	-0.52*** (0.17)
Ruzicka spending per capita	-0.63** (0.26)	-1.12*** (0.41)	-1.07*** (0.41)	-1.04** (0.42)
<i>Conflict Dynamics</i>				
Coalition collateral damage		0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Insurgent collateral damage		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Other small CERP spending			-0.15 (0.23)	-0.17 (0.23)
Other USAID spending			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Coalition troop strength				0.06* (0.03)
CMOC presence				-0.05 (0.04)
PRT presence				0.00 (0.03)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>				
Half year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sunni×half year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Observations	927	927	927	927
R^2	0.18	0.22	0.22	0.22

Notes: Results are from first-differenced OLS regressions with clustering by district. Civilian compensation is per capita while insurgent violence is per 1000 residents, both over six months. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Replication of Analysis on Monthly Data

	M1	M2	M3	M4
<i>Post-Harm Compensation</i>				
Condolence spending per capita	-4.48*** (1.39)	-5.20*** (1.34)		
Ruzicka spending per capita	-8.07 (5.74)	-8.72 (5.41)		
Combined spending per capita			-1.10*** (0.29)	-1.25*** (0.28)
<i>Conflict Dynamics</i>				
Coalition collateral damage	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Insurgent collateral damage	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Other small CERP spending	-3.45** (1.34)	-4.02*** (1.24)	-3.10*** (1.16)	-3.57*** (1.09)
Other USAID spending	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Coalition troop strength	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
PRT presence	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.15)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.15)
CMOC presence	-0.49* (0.27)	-0.55* (0.32)	-0.49* (0.27)	-0.55* (0.32)
<i>Additional Covariates</i>				
Half year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sunni×half year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
All other covariates included		Yes		Yes
Constant	0.10 (0.15)	0.25 (0.16)	0.10 (0.15)	0.25 (0.16)
Observations	6077	5504	6077	5504
R^2	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06

Notes: Results are from first-differenced OLS regressions with clustering by district. Civilian compensation is per capita while insurgent violence is per 1000 residents, both per month. Independent variables are all lagged one month. Combined spending is sum of both types. Standard errors in parentheses. Results show that condolence spending has significant negative effect, while impact of Ruzicka spending is quite close ($p=0.105$ in M2). Combined effect is significant as well.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Replication of Analysis on Weekly Data

	M1	M2	M3	M4
<i>Post-Harm Compensation</i>				
L.Condolence spending per capita	-0.13 (0.48)	-0.44 (0.43)		
L2.Condolence spending per capita	-0.63* (0.37)	-0.62 (0.51)		
L3.Condolence spending per capita	-1.01*** (0.25)	-0.94** (0.37)		
L4.Condolence spending per capita	-1.58*** (0.21)	-1.49*** (0.24)		
L.Ruzicka spending per capita	1.88 (4.45)	1.29 (4.30)		
L2.Ruzicka spending per capita	-1.86 (1.98)	-1.07 (2.09)		
L3.Ruzicka spending per capita	-1.38 (1.91)	-2.13 (2.23)		
L4.Ruzicka spending per capita	3.14 (3.08)	2.52 (2.56)		
L.Combined spending per capita			-0.12 (0.49)	-0.43 (0.44)
L2.Combined spending per capita			-0.63* (0.37)	-0.61 (0.51)
L3.Combined spending per capita			-0.99*** (0.26)	-0.93** (0.37)
L4.Combined spending per capita			-1.53*** (0.24)	-1.46*** (0.25)
<i>Conflict Dynamics</i>				
Coalition collateral damage	-0.05 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)
Insurgent collateral damage	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Other small CERP spending	0.14 (0.55)	-0.31 (0.41)	0.13 (0.55)	-0.32 (0.41)
Other USAID spending	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Coalition troop strength	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.20* (0.12)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.20* (0.12)
PRT presence	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)
CMOC presence	-0.20* (0.11)	-0.25* (0.13)	-0.20* (0.11)	-0.25* (0.13)
<i>Additional Covariates</i>				
Half year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sunni×half year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
All other covariates included		Yes		Yes
Constant	-0.27** (0.12)	0.13* (0.06)	-0.27** (0.12)	0.13* (0.06)
Observations	25956	23853	25956	23853
R ²	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.14

Notes: Results are from first-differenced OLS regressions with clustering by district. Civilian compensation is per capita while insurgent violence is per 1000 residents, both per week. Independent variables are all lagged one week, with four lags of compensation measures. Combined spending is sum of both types. Standard errors in parentheses. Results show that condolence spending and combined spending both have significant negative effects on violence. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Joint Effects of Post-Harm Compensation in Weekly Analysis

	Condolence Spending	Ruzicka Spending	Combined Spending
Joint effect	-3.35*** (0.99)	1.79 (4.67)	-3.28*** (1.04)

Notes: table shows the results of joint significance tests on all four lags of each type of compensation in the preceding (weekly) model. Conventional condolence spending has a negative and significant joint effect, as does both types of spending combined.